



Frequently Asked Questions

1. Would Shield 's Supra-national Council be free from nationalism and other biasing factors which would distort the objectivity of the Council's resolutions?

Firstly, a brief description of the proposed constitution for the Council.

- a) Each one of the 186 member nations of the UN would be eligible to put forward, say, ten of its nationals, from which three would be elected by the General Assembly of the UN to serve on the Shield Council. The UN would have previously issued a demanding specification of the personal qualities and track record required of any person being put forward for election. The specification would stipulate a nil record of political, ideological or religious extremism. It would also require evidence to be available of the intellectual ability and past public service which would include military service.
- b) A Council member would not in any way be a representative of his or her nation's government and would swear to uphold UN law regardless of national or sectional interests and in accordance with a mandate issued by the UN. A similar oath vowing neither to seek nor to take instruction from any government or body' is taken by the Commissioners of the European Community.
- c) The eventual composition of the elected Council would be restricted to a maximum of 66.66% of-male or female members.
- d) Council members who are nationals of nations approaching a state of war or are already at war would be held incommunicado and would take no part in the relevant debates. A voting exclusion would apply to those nations deemed to be closely allied with the belligerent nations.
- e) The remuneration—offered to each elected Council member must reflect the awesome responsibility that he or she must bear. It is proposed that not less than US \$400,000 per annum, free from all taxes, should be paid to each member.

The annual cost, therefore, of the 558 members' salaries would be \$223m, a sum equal to the cost of five warplanes.

Will the proposed constitution of the Council with the safeguards mentioned ensure that it would achieve 66% majority decisions which are free from the taint of nationalism or other biasing influences including even gross corruption?

Suppose it is known that, say, India or Pakistan is making preparations which indicate an attack by one on the other. The Council meet to discuss the situation but its members who are nationals of India or Pakistan are held incommunicado. The nationals of, say, eight other nations which are judged to be close allies of one or other of the potential belligerents are deprived of their vote but not excluded from the meeting. This would leave Council members from 176 of the 186 UN member nations to arrive at a 66% majority decision.

Would such decisions be objective or is it probable that they would be blocked by national bias and other subjective factors? A number of the Council's critics claim (but fail to support their claim with argument) that such distortions are inevitable.

But what possible grounds can be adduced for thinking that Council members, who happen to be nationals of, say, Norway, of Spain, of Ecuador - or anywhere - would, due to their national origins, feel compelled to vote in support of the nationalistic aims of India or Pakistan rather than voting in accordance with the spirit of the mandate they have sworn to uphold? In any case, why should the votes of those Council members who may be subjectively biased always favour, say, Pakistan rather than being evenly supportive of both parties? With an even distribution the biased votes would be self-cancelling so far as being able to block an otherwise 66% majority vote.

The members elected to the Council have not been taken at random off the street. They have been subjected to a most rigorous pre-selection examination. To focus the discussion, let it be assumed that you, the reader, are serving on the Council. Could you see yourself breaking your sworn oath in order to support Pakistan - for no reason other than you were born in the UK or America or wherever? Or could you see yourself supporting India because you had been corrupted by an offer of a substantial sum to do so?

Even to pose these questions is to insult you. Why, then, are you unwilling to grant that the vast majority, if not all, of the carefully selected Council members would also embrace your own impeccable standard of integrity and rectitude?

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, how would a potential aggressor assess the Council's unswerving dedication to the enforcement of UN law? Could he rely on at least a third of the Council's members jettisoning their oaths and voting against a resolution to oppose the aggression with the Council's overwhelming military power - simply because of their national prejudices or because the aggressor anticipates corrupting delinquent Council members with clandestine inducements?

These questions have already been raised and answered and it can be assumed that an aggressor would have no doubt whatsoever that retribution would fall upon his nation at the first aggressive move - and consequently that first move would not be undertaken.

Absolute deterrence arising from the certainty of the Council's response to aggression is central to its entire rationale and there are no grounds for thinking that the Council's collective behaviour under the stress of events would endanger the certainty and integrity of that response.

It is essential that the autonomy of action accorded to the Council cannot be over-ridden by the veto of a single nation. It would be open for consideration, however, whether or not the constitution of the Council should allow for a 75% majority vote taken in the UN

General Assembly to have the power to restrain the Shield Council from proceeding with a mandated course of action. One can visualise exceptional circumstances in which it might be undesirable for the Shield Council to proceed strictly in accordance with its mandated obligations.

2. If you accept that power corrupts would it be an unwarranted risk to create a massive military force under the sole control of a supra-national Council, however carefully its members may have been screened?

This frequently voiced objection is a bizarre extension of the previous criticism. It appears to suggest that the Council members and those in charge of Shield's military forces are likely to break their sworn oaths and all conspire together to seek imperialistic conquest or to interfere in the internal affairs of nations.

I have yet to hear a cogent explanation of what might cause over five hundred high calibre men and women to sink to the criminal level of behaviour suggested. In any case, what conceivable ideological or religious objectives could unite members of originating from cultures based on Islam and Christianity, on autocracy and democracy; and on a dozen other national diversities?

The only credible objective which would unite the Council members would be the one they have sworn to pursue - the elimination of war.

his particular criticism must be regarded as originating from "gut feeling" and, as such, is not susceptible to rational rebuttal. Inexplicably, those who urge this objection are unconcerned that even greater military and nuclear power is already in the hands of one nation - the USA .

3. Would the difficulties involved with creating an effective military force with volunteers from a variety of nations be insuperable due to language differences and the incompatibility of weapon systems?

The problems mentioned in the criticism are acknowledged as existing but are certainly not insuperable. This is confirmed by the existence of NATO and the successful deployment of personnel from a variety of backgrounds during the 1939/45 War. Nevertheless volunteers offering their services to Shield, may, at all levels, be required to be fluent in at least one of the five major languages.

The criticism does not relate to the core principles of Shield's rationale, it is no more than an overstatement of an obvious implementation problem.

During the debate involving Shield it is usual to be heavily challenged with a flood of implementational problems or to be given a series of finely drawn instances in which the application of Shield's broad principles of action may become uncertain or blurred.

For all such instances set against Shield I believe I could give matching incongruities in the principles and practice of our legal system and of our democracy. But thank heavens, law and democracy continue to preserve the society in which we live!

4. The Shield Military Enforcement Arm would be equipped with an extensive fleet of Trident type submarines equipped with missiles armed with nuclear warheads.

Would this be contrary to the efforts being made to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in existence? And in what possible circumstances would Shield be justified in launching its nuclear weapons?

The possession by Shield of nuclear weapons would be universally known. It would also be realised that the one time Cold War principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) could not be applied to Shield as it would not possess towns, territory or a civilian population to protect. Consequently, Shield would have an immunity to reciprocal destruction in the event of launching its nuclear weapons against an aggressor also possessing nuclear weapons. This immunity would make Shield's final ultimatum to an aggressor non-negotiable as the aggressor's nuclear weapons would not pose a reciprocal threat. Consequently Shield's absolute command of the nuclear chessboard would make the possession of nuclear weapons for defence unnecessary thus facilitating a rapid reduction of the nuclear weapons held by nuclear powers. Additionally, it would reduce, even eliminate the clandestine efforts by a number of nations to acquire nuclear weapons.

The criticism includes the question: what possible circumstances would justify Shield using its nuclear weapons?

It would be open to debate and- expert guidance how Shield's Rules of Engagement should be written to regulate its response to an act of aggression. Hawks would no doubt argue that if it is known that Shield will use nuclear weapons as an immediate response to aggression the deterrent effect would ensure no acts of aggression took place.

The less hawkish approach would prefer to see a proportional and incremental response starting with the use of conventional weapons only escalating to the use of -nuclear weapons as a -last resort.

The hawks would use the argument that in 1945 two atom bombs caused Japan to surrender in order to prevent the progressive destruction of its core economy. It would be reasonable to assume, the hawks would claim, that if the US alone had possessed atom bombs prior to Pearl Harbour, Japan would not have gone to war in the first place. Hawks would also point out that the number of deaths arising from the use of the atom bombs on Japan was a fraction of the deaths which would have occurred if an American invasion of the mainland had been attempted using "acceptable" conventional weapons.

reasonable compromise would be for Shield's access to conventional forces and weapons to be extensive and to include seaborne airpower to facilitate high precision bombing of civil targets such as electrical generator stations, bridges and government administrative centres. If eventually nuclear weapons had to be used, due warning would be given to allow evacuation of the targeted areas. If Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been given forty eight hours prior

warning of the destruction to follow, the casualties could well have been reduced to several hundred.

5. Would the additional cost of contributing to the maintenance of Shield be unacceptable to many nations which already find their defence budgets and payments to the UN unduly onerous?

The global amount currently spent by nations on defence and armaments totals approximately US \$680,000,000,000 per annum (US \$680 billion). If each nation contributed to the annual running costs of Shield a sum equal to 2 % of its current defence budget. The total contributed would be US \$13.6 billion. This would meet the annual costs of the Council at US \$1 billion and the annual running costs of the Trident type submarine fleet at US \$5 billion, which includes a provision for a ten year amortisation of the vessels. The remaining balance of US \$7.6 billion would meet the costs of a high command structure and rapid reaction land, air and sea combat units involving between 50,000 and 60,000 personnel. These highly mobile forces would be used for active intervention in smaller scale incidents.

The reader is reminded that in larger incidents Shield 's strategy would be, and would be known to be, the progressive destruction of an aggressor nation's economy and infrastructure until it stops its aggressive actions. Nevertheless, the following proposal would, at little extra cost, provide Shield with an enormously powerful backup to its rapid reaction forces if an unusual set of circumstances required an aggressor's armed forces to be resisted with conventional forces.

Nations which proposed to maintain significant armed forces after Shield was up and running would give an irrevocable undertaking that a specified number and type of their combat units, such as a tank regiment, a squadron of war planes, an aircraft carrier, would be instantly and unreservedly available for service under Shield 's High Command should Shield requisition them. An arrangement similar to this proposal was included in the UN Charter in 1945, but with little subsequent effect.

The less hawkish approach would prefer to see a proportional and incremental response starting with the use of conventional weapons only escalating to the use of -nuclear weapons as a -last resort.

The hawks would use the argument that in 1945 two atom bombs caused Japan to surrender in order to prevent the progressive destruction of its core economy. It would be reasonable to assume, the hawks would claim, that if the US alone had possessed atom bombs prior to Pearl Harbour , Japan would not have gone to war in the first place. Hawks would also point out that the number of deaths arising from the use of the atom bombs on Japan was a fraction of the deaths which would have occurred if an American invasion of the mainland had been attempted using "acceptable" conventional weapons.

reasonable compromise would be for Shield 's access to conventional forces and weapons to be extensive and to include seaborne airpower to facilitate high precision bombing of civil targets such as electrical generator stations, bridges and government administrative centres. If eventually nuclear weapons had to be used, due warning would be given to allow evacuation of the targeted areas. If Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been given forty eight hours prior

warning of the destruction to follow, the casualties could well have been reduced to several hundred.